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Does cutting red tape foster entrepreneurship in industries with the potential to expand?
We address this question by combining the time needed to comply with government entry
procedures in 45 countries with industry-level data on employment growth and growth in
the number of establishments during the 1980s. Our main empirical ﬁnding is that countries
where it takes less time to register new businesses have seen more entry in industries that
experienced expansionary global demand and technology shifts. Our estimates take into
account that proxying global industry shifts using data from only one country–or group of
countries with similar entry regulations–will in general yield biased results.  
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In this paper we examine whether countries with longer administrative delays to start up 
new businesses see less entry in globally expanding industries. 
 
Our starting point is the world equilibrium multi-industry model of Ciccone and 
Papaioannou (2007), which features love for variety preferences and increasing returns. 
In the simplified version of the model we sketch here, inter-sectoral factor (employment) 
reallocation is a function of global prices, preference shifts and technology shocks at the 
industry level. Country-specific administrative delays to incorporate a new business are 
modelled as an adjustment mechanism that potentially affects the introduction of new 
varieties (firm entry) in response to the global shocks. In the frictionless case, new 
product varieties (firms) enter (exit) until all profits (losses) due to demand and supply 
shifts have been eliminated. When, however, there are barriers to entrepreneurship 
existing rather than new firms absorb most of the shocks, and industry entry is therefore 
relatively slower in globally expanding sectors. 
 
We then test for the entry prediction of the model combining recently constructed 
country-level indicators of administrative barriers to start up a new businesses (from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003), country-industry entry rates in 
the 1980s (from UNIDO) and two proxies of industry global factor reallocation. First, 
following the finance and industry growth literature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that 
suggests using data from an advanced country with low frictions in product, labor, and 
capital markets to proxy for global industry characteristics, we proxy frictionless factor 
reallocation using US industry employment growth (using data from the NBER 
Manufacturing Database).  However using only the US (or any other benchmark country) 
based proxy for global industry shifts will in general lead to biased results because this 
proxy will also reflect US industry shifts. If such measurement error reflects US 
idiosyncrasies only, it will lead us to understate the negative effects of time-consuming 
government procedures on entry. But if US employment growth is a better proxy for 
technology and demand shifts in countries with short administrative delays than countries 
5
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administrative entry delay. We therefore combine the US based proxy with a second 
proxy of global industry shifts that does not reflect US trends or idiosyncrasies specific to 
countries with a certain level of administrative entry delays (in an instrumental-variables 
setting). 
 
Using establishment growth data to proxy for entry in 45 industrial, emerging and 
underdeveloped countries in the 1980s we find that countries with higher barriers to 
entrepreneurship experience slower entry in industries that expanded globally. This result 
is robust to controlling for alternative channels of industry growth, such as the differential 
effect of financial development for external-finance sectors and the disproportionate 
effect of human capital for skill-intensive sectors. We show that the result is not driven 
by the level of income, property rights protection or schooling. Our finding prevails when 
we account for measurement error in the industry-level proxy of global factor reallocation 
and when we isolate the historically predetermined component of entry regulation using 
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Eliminating needlessly time-consuming government procedures ("red tape") to start up
new businesses is high on policy agendas. One reason is that cutting the time needed to
comply with government regulations is expected to foster the necessary entrepreneurship in
industries with the potential to expand. It is therefore interesting to ask whether countries
where new businesses can be registered more quickly have seen more entry in industries that
experienced expansionary global demand and technology shifts. We address this question
by combining data on the time needed to comply with government entry procedures in
45 countries with industry-level data on employment growth and growth in the number of
establishments during the 1980s.
Our empirical approach is based on the multi-industry world-equilibrium model of Cic-
cone and Papaioannou (2006). In the simpliﬁed version we present here, country-industries
are subject to anticipated country-speciﬁc as well as global demand and technology shifts.
Because of demand for variety ("love for variety"), industry employment growth is ac-
companied by growth in product variety in the free-entry equilibrium. Time-consuming
government procedures slow down the emergence of new varieties relative to the free-entry
equilibrium. The model implies that countries where it takes longer to deal with govern-
ment procedures see slower variety growth in industries with free-entry employment growth
due to global supply and demand shifts.
To test this model implication we need proxies for: (i) cross-country diﬀerences in the
time needed to comply with government procedures when introducing a new variety; (ii)
cross-country cross-industry variety growth; and (iii) cross-industry free-entry employment
growth due to global technology and demand shifts. Our main proxy for country-level
administrative delay is the time to obtain legal status to operate a ﬁrm from Djankov
et al. (2002). Country-industry variety growth will be proxied by the growth rate of
establishments from the UNIDO.
Our ﬁrst proxy of free-entry industry employment growth due to global technology and
demand shifts is US industry employment growth. This is a natural starting point as the
US economy gets closest to the frictionless free-entry scenario, at least among countries
with high-quality industry statistics. Still, Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) show that
using only this US based proxy for global industry shifts will in general lead to biased
7
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shifts, which introduces measurement error into the empirical analysis. If measurement
error only reﬂects US idiosyncrasies, it will lead us to understate the negative eﬀects of
time-consuming government procedures on entry. But if US employment growth is a better
proxy for technology and demand shifts in countries with short administrative delays than
countries with long delays, measurement error could lead us to overstate the negative eﬀects
of administrative entry delay. These biases can be avoided by instrumenting the US based
proxy with a second proxy of industry shifts that does not reﬂect US trends or trends
speciﬁc to countries with a certain level of administrative entry delays. We use an estimate
of free-entry industry employment growth in a (hypothetical) country facing world-average
demand and technology shifts. This estimate can be obtained as non-US world-average
employment growth by industry controlling for employment growth (possibly) not reﬂecting
global demand and technology shifts in countries with long administrative entry delays. The
necessary cross-country industry employment data are available from UNIDO.
Our main empirical ﬁnding is that countries where legal status to operate ﬁrms can be
obtained more quickly see signiﬁcantly more entry in industries that experienced expan-
sionary global demand and technology shifts. This remains the case when we allow entry in
expanding industries to be related to labor market regulation, property rights protection,
or economic development. The result continues to hold when we account for the eﬀects of
country-level ﬁnancial development and investor protection on entry in ﬁnance-dependent
industries emphasized in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Perotti and Volpin (2006).
The recent construction of market regulation indicators for a broad cross-section of
countries (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002, 2003; Botero et al., 2004) has made it possible to
examine the eﬀects of regulation on cross-country economic performance. Given our focus on
the link between country-level entry regulation and industry-level entry, the two most closely
related papers in this literature are the empirical studies of Fisman and Sarria-Allende
( 2 0 0 4 )a n dK l a p p e r ,L a e v e na n dR a j a n( f o r t hcoming). Fisman and Sarria-Allende show
that countries with more costly product market regulation see slower entry in industries
with growth opportunities as proxied by US industry sales growth. Klapper, Laeven and
Rajan show that European countries with more costly entry regulations experience slower
growth in the number of ﬁrms in industries with high entry in the US (they ﬁnd similar
results using the UK or the European average as a benchmark). Our work diﬀers in two
main respects. First, we combine two proxies of global industry-level demand and technology
8
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theoretical framework underlying our empirical approach leads us to focus on the time
delay–rather than the cost–associated with entry regulations.
2T h e o r y
The world consists of a continuum of open economies with mass N. Each economy is in-
habited by households with preferences over diﬀerentiated goods produced in a continuum
of industries with mass I. Across industries, preferences are Ut =
R I
0 Citdi where Cit is
consumption of industry-i composites at time t. Industry-i composites are made up of dif-







Cint is consumption of the industry-i country-n composite, Bint is a preference shifter,
and σ>0 is the elasticity of substitution between composites produced in diﬀerent coun-
tries. Country-industry composites are in turn made up of an (endogenous) measure of






where cinvt denotes consumption of variety v
in country-industry n, i and  >1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the
same country. Labor is supplied inelastically and immobile internationally.






where Aint > 0 captures the eﬃciency of production and fin = fifn is an overhead labor
requirement that we allow to vary across countries (as captured by fn) and industries
(captured by fi). Hence, technology diﬀers across country-industries but is assumed to
be the same for all varieties in a country-industry. To simplify further we also take the
preference shifter and technology parameter to be the product of an industry-speciﬁca n d
a country-speciﬁcp a r t ,
(2) Aint = AitAnt and Bint = BitBnt.










1Using cross-country averages does not avoid such biases because, if regulation matters, cross-country
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the cost of purchasing one
unit of the industry-i composite.
Symmetric Equilibrium with Free Entry Each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm
that maximizes proﬁts, taking prices of all other ﬁrms and the price of labor, wnt,a sg i v e n .
Firms observe technology and preference parameters before they make their employment
decisions (see Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006, for the case with unanticipated demand and
technology shifts). Because ﬁrms face constant-elasticity demand functions, their proﬁt-
maximizing price consists of a constant markup over their marginal cost of production,
pinvt =(  /(  − 1))(wnt/Aint).
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for all countries to produce in all industries is that
demand for the typical variety is increasing in the price of the domestic competition in the
same industry, which requires that  >σ . In this case, the free-entry measure of varieties
V ∗
int and free-entry employment L∗
int in each country-industry satisfy



























where θ is an unimportant positive constant. Hence, free-entry equilibrium variety and
employment growth depend on global industry-level technology and demand shifts (changes
in Ait and Bit), global industry price movements (changes in Pit), as well as the country-
level and global factors collected in the second square bracket (domestic wages, country-level
demand and supply shocks, and global demand).
Time-Consuming Procedures and Delayed Entry Consider economies that diﬀer
in the time needed to comply with government entry procedures (TimePcdn) when they
are faced with technology and demand shifts. A simple way of capturing the link between
actual variety growth ∆lnVin =l nVict −lnVint−1 a n df r e e - e n t r yg r o w t hi nt h e s ee c o n o m i e s
is
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variety growth relative to the free-entry benchmark, then λ>0.W h e n λ =0 ,e n t r yi s
unaﬀected by TimePcdn.
Entry and Global Reallocation In a free-entry equilibrium, variety growth equals




int−1 (see (4)). Because industry-
employment growth has a global component (captured by the ﬁrst square bracket in (4)),w e
can write country-industry variety growth in (5) as a function of global industry employment
shifts ∆lnL∗
i,
(6) ∆lnVin = δn + δi − λ(TimePcdn∆lnL∗
i),
where δn, δi capture country and industry eﬀects. The parameter we are interested in
estimating is λ,t h ee ﬀect of time-consuming procedures on the entry in globally expanding
industries.
It is interesting to note that in our model it is administrative delay that matters for
entry in expanding industries. Regulations that increase the overhead cost of production,
for example, but do not cause delay, aﬀect the free-entry measure of varieties but not entry
in response to technology and demand shifts.
3 Data and Empirical Results
Data Our cross-country industry data come from the UNIDO 3-IndStat database. The
data cover 45 countries in a maximum of 28 manufacturing industries. We proxy variety
growth (∆lnVin in (6)) by annual log growth of establishments over the 1981-1990 pe-
riod in industry i of country n (ENTRYin). Our measures for administrative entry delay
(TimePcdn in (6)) come from Djankov et al. (2002). They construct cross-country in-
dicators for the time and the number of administrative procedures required to start up a
new business. Our ﬁrst proxy for global free-entry industry employment growth (∆lnL∗
i
in (6)) is annual employment growth in the U.S. during the 1980s, which we take from
the NBER Manufacturing Industry Database. In addition, we use UNIDO cross-country
industry employment data to estimate free-entry industry employment growth in a (hypo-
thetical) country facing world-average demand and technology shifts. We explain below
how this estimate is obtained and how it can be used to avoid the biases when using only
11
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variable deﬁnitions and sources. The Supplementary Appendix reports the industry-level
and country-level values of all the variables.2
Benchmark Estimates Table 2 reports least squares eﬀects of the log time to register
new businesses (TIMEn) on entry using US industry employment growth (EMPGRi)a s
a proxy for global industry employment shifts. In all models we control for country and
industry eﬀects. Moreover, we account for the initial industry composition by controlling
for 1981 log employment and log number of establishments of industries, both of which are
highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations3 (the literature sometimes uses size and sometimes
number of establishments, see Rajan and Zingales, 1998, and Perotti and Volpin, 2006, re-
spectively; we show in Supplementary Appendix Table 3 that results are robust to dropping
these controls).
The results in column (1) show a highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the TIMEn ×
EMPGRi interaction on country-industry establishment growth. Hence, countries where
it takes longer to register new businesses see slower entry in expanding industries. The
least squares coeﬃcient (−0.167) implies an annual growth diﬀerential of approximately
0.385 − 0.40% between an industry with EMPGRi around the 75th percentile and an
industry around the 25th percentile if they operate in Italy (62 days to incorporate a new
business; close to the 75th percentile of TIME), rather than Finland (24 days to incorporate
a new business; the country at 25th percentile of TIME). To put this into perspective,
median annual establishment growth in our sample is 1.05%.
Is this result driven by the time to register new businesses standing in for other types of
regulation, such as labor market regulation? We address this issue in column (2) where we
augment the speciﬁcation in (1) by an interaction between EMPGRi a n da ne m p l o y m e n t
protection index from Botero et al. (2004) (LMRn; see Table 1 for details). It can be seen
that the time to register new businesses remains highly signiﬁcant, while LMR does not
appear to play a role for establishment growth.
2Available at www.crei.cat/people/ciccone/papers.htm.
3The initial number of establishments enters negatively while initial employment enters positively. Hence,
entry is larger when industries start out with large establishments. The negative eﬀect of the initial number
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rights enforcement? To check on this, we augment the speciﬁcation in (1) by an interaction
between EMPGRi and an index of the ineﬀectiveness of property rights enforcement by
courts from Djankov et al. (forthcoming) (LAWINEFn, which measures the time it takes
to resolve a payment dispute in court; see Table 1 for details). The results in column (3)
show that the time to register new businesses remains a negative and signiﬁcant determinant
of entry, while property rights enforcement does not appear to matter for entry in industries
with the potential to expand.
Does administrative entry delay matter simply because it captures the level of economic
development? The speciﬁcation in column (4) addresses this point by interacting EMPGRi
with both TIMEn and log GDP per capita (Yn). The time-to-register-new-businesses
interaction is again negative and signiﬁcant, while there is no evidence that more developed
countries see faster establishment growth in industries facing expansionary demand and
technology shifts.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries with greater external-ﬁnance dependence
(EXTFINi; see Table 1) see lower rates of entry in ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries.
To take this into account we extend the speciﬁcation in (1) by an interaction between
industry external-ﬁnance dependence and country-level ﬁnancial development (FDn,w h i c h
measures private credit relative to GDP; see Table 1 for details). Column (5) shows that
adding ﬁnancial development to the speciﬁcation changes the coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance
l e v e lo ft h et i m e - t o - r e g i s t e r - n ew-businesses interaction by little. It can also be seen that
ﬁnancial development raises entry in external-ﬁnance dependent industries.
Perotti and Volpin (2004) ﬁnd that external-ﬁnance-dependent industries see slower en-
try in countries with bad property rights enforcement. In column (6), we therefore augment
the speciﬁcation in (1) by a LAWINEFn × EXTFINi interaction. The time-to-register-
new-businesses interaction continues to enter negatively and signiﬁcantly. The results also
show that bad property rights enforcement lowers entry in external-ﬁnance dependent in-
dustries.
Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) argue that product market regulation lowers entry in
industries with growth opportunities, which they proxy by US sales growth. In column (7),
we include an interaction of the time to register new businesses with both EMPGRi and
sales growth (SALESGRi; see Table 1) and ﬁnd that the employment-growth interaction
Maybe the time to register new businesses aﬀects entry in industries with the potential
13
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 758 
June 2007dominates the sales-growth interaction. One explanation for this ﬁnding is that employment
growth is a better measure of the industry shifts that trigger the entry of new varieties than
sales growth. This would be the case if prices adjust more quickly than employment and
ﬁrms are sometimes faced with unexpected, short-lived productivity and demand shocks.
Sensitivity In Supplementary Appendix Table 4, we show that results are similar when
we use estimation approaches that are less sensitive to so-called inﬂuential observations
("outliers") than ordinary least squares (the results in the Supplementary Appendix are
obtained using robust regressions, which assign lower weight to inﬂuential observations;
least absolute deviation estimation yields the same ﬁndings).4
We also ﬁnd similar results when we measure TimePcdn as the log number of diﬀerent
procedures a new ﬁrm has to comply with to obtain legal status (PROCEDn)o rb yt h e
log number of procedures with the exception of regulations related to safety, health and
environmental issues, taxes, or labor aﬀairs (STEPSn). Moreover, expressing these vari-
ables in levels rather than in logs yields equivalent results. Results are sensitive to the exact
speciﬁcation when we use the cost–instead of the time delay–to obtain legal status as a
share of per capita GDP (also available from Djankov et al., 2002). The cost share yields
insigniﬁcant estimates, but expressing the variable in logs yields results similar to Table 1.
Accounting for Measurement Error Due to US Technology and Demand Shifts
So far we have ignored that US industry employment growth reﬂects global as well as US
technology and demand shifts. Taking this into account is important because it results
in US employment growth reﬂecting global industry demand and productivity shifts with
error. Such measurement error may lead to biased estimates of the eﬀect of administrative
delay on entry in industries that faced expansionary global demand and technology shifts
(Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006). The bias will be downward if measurement error mostly
reﬂects demand and technology shifts that are idiosyncratic to the US. But in principle the
bias could also be upward. Consider the case where demand and technology shifts are more
similar between countries with short administrative entry delays (like the US) than countries
with long delays. In this case, US industry employment growth will be more closely related
to industry entry patterns in countries with short delays, even if administrative delay is
4The UNIDO establishment growth data contain some implausible values. Other country-industry studies
therefore cut oﬀ observations in the tails of the distribution.
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by US employment growth may lead us to mistakenly conclude that administrative delay
matters for entry.
Consistent estimation of the eﬀect of administrative delay on entry in industries with the
potential to expand requires a measure of industry demand and technology shifts that does
not reﬂect US trends or trends speciﬁc to countries with a certain level of administrative
entry delay. One such measure is free-entry industry employment growth in a (hypothetical)
country facing world-average demand and technology shifts. Ciccone and Papaioannou
(2006) show that these industry employment growth rates can be estimated in two steps.
First, obtain the least squares prediction for annual country-industry employment growth for
the 1980s (P-EMPGRin) based on industry eﬀects and country-level growth determinants
as P-EMPGRin = b γn+b γi+b δiTIMEn+b β lnEMPin1980, where b γn is the estimated country
eﬀect; b γi the estimated industry eﬀect; b δi the estimated marginal eﬀect of the time to register
new businesses on employment growth in industry i;a n db β lnEMPin controls for the eﬀect
of the initial industry composition (dropping this term does not aﬀect results). No US
data are used in estimation to ensure that these predictions do not reﬂect US industry
trends. Second, predict industry employment growth rates for US values of TIMEn as
G-EMPGRi = P-EMPGRiUS = b γi +b δiTIMEUS + b β lnEMPiUS1980.
As no US data are used in the estimation of b γi and b δi, G-EMPGRi reﬂects free-entry
employment growth in a (hypothetical) country experiencing the world-average non-US
demand and technology shifts. One can therefore estimate the eﬀe c to fe n t r yd e l a yo ne n t r y
in industries facing expansionary global demand and technology shifts by using a two-stage
least squares approach with G-EMPGRi as an instrument for EMPGRi.5 (This two-stage
approach is preferable to measuring global industry shifts using only G-EMPGRi as these
estimates contain sampling error.)
Table 3, column (1) reports our (two-stage least squares) estimate of the eﬀect of the
time to register new businesses on entry in expanding industries when using TIMEn × G-
EMPGRi as an instrument for TIMEn × EMPGRi.T h e c o e ﬃcient is negative and
signiﬁcant and larger in absolute value than the estimate in column (1) of Table 1. Hence,
this approach yields even stronger evidence that the time to register new businesses has
5G-EMPGRi turns out to have a strong positive eﬀect on EMPGRi, as one would expect if US inter-
industry employment reallocation partly reﬂects global demand and technology shifts. The least squares
coeﬃc i e n ti s0 . 8 9a n dh a sat - s t a t i s t i cg r e a t e rt h a ns i x .
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shifts.
In columns (2) to (4), we reestimate the speciﬁcation in column (1) using the other
entry regulation indicators of Djankov et al. (2002) instead of TIMEn. I nc o l u m n( 2 )
w es h o wt h a tt h er e s u l t sa r er o b u s tt ou s i n gt h el o go ft h en u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent procedures
(rather than the days required) that a new ﬁrm has to comply with to obtain a legal status
(PROCEDn). In column (3) we show that results are very similar to column (2) when we
use the log number of procedures with the exception of those procedures that are associated
with safety, health and environmental issues, taxes, or labor aﬀairs (STEPSn). In column
(4) and (5), we ﬁnd similar results when proxying entry regulation by the cost of obtaining
legal status as a share of per capita GDP (COSTn and TIMECOSTn;s e eT a b l e1 ) .
In principle it is possible that the time to register new businesses, or the other measures
of entry regulation of Djankov et al. (2002), responds to industry-level technology and
demand shifts. Possible instruments for administrative entry delay come from Djankov et
al. (2002) and Shleifer (2005). They argue that the legal system of countries is a histori-
cally predetermined variable with long-lasting eﬀects on regulation policies. For example,
they show that countries with a Common Law system regulate entry less than countries
inﬂuenced by the French Commercial Code (they classify legal systems as belonging to ﬁve
legal families: English Common Law; French Commercial Code; German Commercial Code;
Scandinavian Commercial Code; and Socialist/Communist laws). In column (6) we there-
fore instrument both parts of the interaction between the time to register new businesses
and employment growth. In particular, we use interactions between G-EMPGRi and in-
dicator variables for the ﬁve legal families as instruments for TIMEn × EMPGRi.N o t e
that while the estimate is now larger in absolute value than in column (1), it is also noisier.
Still, the interaction continues to be signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level. In columns (7)
to (10), we ﬁnd analogous results using the other measures of administrative time delay or
entry cost of Djankov et al. (2002). In Supplementary Appendix Table 5, we show that
reestimating columns (1) to (10) without the (highly signiﬁcant) country-industry controls
for size and number of establishments leads to weaker results.
16
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How does entry respond to global industry demand and technology shifts when countries
diﬀer in the amount of red tape new businesses have to deal with? The multi-industry
world-equilibrium model of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) predicts slower adjustment in
countries with time-consuming entry procedures. Empirically, we ﬁnd that countries where
it takes more time to register new businesses saw slower establishment growth in industries
that experienced expansionary global demand and technology shifts. Our estimates take
into account that proxying global industry demand and technology shifts using data from
only one country–or group of countries with similar entry regulations–will in general yield
biased results.
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Average annual change of log number of establishments in industry i in country n over the 
1981-1990 period. We use all countries with data on entry regulation, but we exclude countries 
with less than 10 industry observations and country-industries with less than 5 observations.  
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Statistics, 2005. 
Establishments 
[ESTABLin] 
Log number of establishments in industry i in country n in the initial year (1981).  
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Statistics, 2005. 
Employment Size  
[SIZEin] 
Log employment in industry i in country n in the starting year (1981).  
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Statistics, 2005. 
  




Annual change of log employment in industry i in the US over the 1980-1989 period.  
Original source: NBER Manufacturing Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996).  
Estimated World-
Average Industry 
Employment Shifts  
[G-EMPGR i] 
 
Estimated industry employment shifts at the U.S. level of entry regulation. These estimates 
are obtained in two steps: 
- Step 1: Regress industry-country employment growth for all countries except the U.S. on 
country dummies, industry dummies, and industry dummies interacted with country-level entry 
regulation. 
- Step 2: Obtain G-EMPGR i as predicted industry employment growth for a country with the 
US level of entry regulation. See the main text for details. 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Statistics, 2005; and 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). 
External-Finance 
Dependence [EXTFINi] 
Industry dependence on external finance. The median of the ratio of capital expenditure minus 
cash flow to capital expenditure for U.S. firms averaged over the 1980-1989 period.  
Source: Klingebiel, Kroszner, and Laeven (forthcoming). Original source: COMPUSTAT. 
External-Finance 
Dependence [EXTFINi] 
Industry dependence on external finance. The median of the ratio of capital expenditure minus 
cash flow to capital expenditure for U.S. firms averaged over the 1980-1989 period.  
Source: Klingebiel, Kroszner, and Laeven (forthcoming). Original source: COMPUSTAT. 
Sales Growth 
[SALESGRi] 
Annual change of log shipments in industry i in the US over the 1980-1989 period.  
Original Source: NBER Manufacturing Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). 
 
Panel C: Country Level 
  
Time-Consuming 
Government Entry  
Procedures 
[TimePcdn] 
1.  TIME: Natural logarithm of the number of days required to obtain legal status to operate a 
firm in 1999. 
2.  PROCED: Natural logarithm of the number of different procedures that a start-up business 
has to comply with to obtain a legal status in 1999. 
3.  STEPS: Natural logarithm of the number of different steps that a start-up has to comply 
with in order to obtain a registration certificate that is not associated with safety and health 
issues, the environment, taxes, or labor in 1999. 
Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). 
Entry Cost  
[EntCostn] 
1.  COST: Direct cost of obtaining legal status to operate a firm as a share of GDP p.c. in 
1999. 
2.  TIMECOST: Direct cost plus the monetized value of entrepreneur’s time of obtaining legal 
status to operate a firm as a share of GDP p.c. in 1999. 
Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). 
Labor Market 
Regulation [LMRn] 
Employment protection index based on the existence of alternative employment contracts, the 
cost of increasing hours, the cost of firing, and the formality of dismissal procedures. 
Source: Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004). 
Financial Development 
[FDn] 
Log of average domestic credit to the private sector relative to GDP in the 1980s.  
Source: World Bank World Development Indicator's Database (2005).  
Income/GDP [Yn]  Log of real per capita GDP in 1980.  
Source: Penn World Tables 5.6 Edition. 
Law Ineffectiveness 
[LAWINEFn] 
Legal system ineffectiveness index, based on the number of calendar days to resolve a payment 
dispute through courts (unpaid debt worth 50% of the GDP per capita).  
Source: Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (forthcoming). 
Legal Origin [LEGORn]  A set of dummy variables that identifies the legal origin of the Commercial Code. 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999). 
   
 
Table 1 reports variable definitions and sources. The first column reports the variable name and the abbreviation; the second column 
reports definition and sources. Supplementary Appendix Table 1 reports the values of the industry-level variables for each of the 28 
manufacturing industries. Supplementary Appendix Table 2 reports the values of the country-level variables for each of the 45 countries. 
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Table 2: Time-Consuming Procedures, Employment Reallocation, and Entry. OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the annual log change in the number of establishments at the industry-country level for the period 19
81-1990 (ENTRY). Table 1 gives detailed variable 































































































































































Table 3: Time-Consuming Procedures, Employment Reallocation, and Entry. 
Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates
Industry-Level IV
"Double" (Country-Level & Industry-Level) IV
Notes 
The dependent variable is the annual log change in the number of establishments at the industry-country level for the period 19
81-1990 (ENTRY). Table 1 gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources. All models report instrumental variable coefficients. In columns (1)-(5) [Industry-Level IV model
s] the TimePcd X EMPGR and the EntCost X 
EMPGR interactions are instrumented by, respectively, TimePcd X G-EMPGR and EntCost X G-EMPGR. In columns (6)-(10) [Double (Cou
ntry-Level and Industry-Level) IV 
models] we instrument TimePcd X EMPGR and EntCost X EMPGR by interactions of legal origin dummy variables (LEGOR) with G-EMPGR.
 Absolute values of t-statistics based 
on robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients.
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